To Be a Power Broker, You Must Break Norms: Australian Refugee Detention Policy
By Leah Breevoort
Inked borders no longer accurately represent the nation-state system that mobilized populations navigate. Today, borders can extend far beyond a state’s territory through policies and actions aimed at keeping irregular migrants beyond a state’s humanitarian responsibility. When Australia operationalized off-shore migrant processing centers on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru in the early 2000s, they set a precedent in the region—refugees are not welcome. The conditions of the two locations detaining asylum seekers failed to meet humanitarian standards, a fact policy makers assumed would deter asylum seekers from making the dangerous trek. By maintaining control of detention centers outside its territory, Australia can appear to uphold its obligations under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees while supposedly avoiding violation of the non-refoulement clause, which prohibits the forced return of refugees to a country where they may be subjected to persecution. This policy brings into question the idea of a “safe third country”, a country through which an asylum seeker traveled prior to reaching their final destination that could have granted them protection. Both offshoring and interdiction activate the safe third country requirement and rely on cooperation from Australia’s regional neighbors. By instituting both of these policies, Australia has made false assumptions about its political authority and ability to exert control over neighboring countries. If Australia wishes to truly become a hegemonic regional influence, it must start by taking a human rights-based approach to migration policy, beginning with the closure of all off-shore detention centers.
The legacy of discouraging “spontaneous” asylum seekers began during the 1990s by focusing on containing refugees still in transit to Australia’s shores. The “Pacific Strategy,” as it was initially termed, established bilateral agreements between Australia and Nauru and Australia and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. The memorandums of understanding concentrated on interdiction strategies and the transfer of asylum seekers to “safe third countries.” However, the underlying relationship is derived from an asymmetric power dynamic “whereby cooperating states are persuaded to act in the interests of the developed states through a variety of mechanisms, including financial incentives, the provision of training, or deployment of officials.”[1] Australia opened off-shore processing centers in both locations, financing the endeavors and providing additional development aid to both nations. These border externalization policies are based on the idea that “parts of a state territory can in fact be ‘excised,’ thus creating zones in which officials are not obliged to provide foreign individuals with the same protections available to those officially on state territory.”[2] This approach redefined norms within the region, but was by no means innovative.
After an attempted coup in 1991, tens of thousands of Haitian refugees began crossing the Caribbean. The US responded by transforming the American military base on Guantanamo into a makeshift refugee camp. Similar to justifications given under the Pacific Strategy, temporarily housing Haitians on Guantanamo aimed to relieve pressure from US Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and provide a more stable environment for interviews to occur. However, using the base was a strategic move. Legally, Guantanamo fell outside US territory and beyond the State’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the US could deport individuals who failed to acquire refugee status back to Haiti without supposedly violating non-refoulement laws. Policies such as these mask the underlying purpose of off-shore detention under the guise of humanitarian response.
While the US Government began instituting these policies, the media simultaneously started painting Haitian refugees as economic migrants. Australia espouses a similar condemnation of “queue jumpers.” In a negotiation of the Pacific Solution, the senate committee recognized the paradox:
The idea that Australia may have international protection obligations to people who arrive uninvited and without authorisation is often challenging and unwelcome. Boat arrivals are seen as ‘breaking the rules’ and ‘jumping the queue’, or as not being genuine refugees, even though the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs’ own figures show that a significant proportion are subsequently found to be genuinely in need of protection. [3]
In 2017, the Australian Government further condemned “queue-jumpers” by announcing it would no longer provide basic services for refugees within its borders, such as accommodation, financial support, and trauma counseling.[3] Law makers justify this action by asserting it deters economic migrants, a common rhetoric that delegitimizes an entire group’s refugee status. Simultaneously, by using words such as “smuggling” and “safety,” the government sells a humanitarian narrative to the general public, suggesting an intention of saving lives and combating dangerous criminals.[4] Through both strategies, Australia is able to rationalize the detention of “rule breakers”, the effects of which have been well documented by the media and human rights watch groups.
Most significantly, critics argue the detention of individuals, including children, is in violation of the Convention on Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 2016, the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court ruled that the incarceration of asylum seekers and refugees on Manus Island was illegal and the detention center should be closed. Australian Immigration Minister Peter Dutton responded saying the decision “does not alter Australia’s border protection policies.” According to Dutton, those in the Australian-controlled Manus Island processing center found to be refugees would be able to resettle in PNG and those denied should return to their country of origin.[5] On the day Manus Island’s detention center was slated to close, 600 residents refused to leave, citing safety concerns. Australian authorities immediately departed and food, water, and power was subsequently suspended. While other accommodations on the island were made available, refugees feared they would be subjected to mob attacks and raised concerns over buying food or medicine.[6] In addition, while PNG is a signatory of the 1951 Convention, it holds many reservations and cannot be considered a “safe third country”. Despite this, Australia plans to pay for the resettlement of refugees on PNG.
As the dominant westernized power in the Pacific, the international arena expects Australia to uphold a higher standard of human rights. Doing so exerts a form of soft power that could potentially co-opt other regional players, particularly those who have not signed the 1951 Convention. Instead, by rejecting the notion of burden-sharing, Australia continues to isolate itself politically within a region multilaterally engaged through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Australia is not a member. This declining hegemonic control is also underscored by Indonesia’s reluctance to cooperate in policies aimed at stemming migration through the popular transit country. Prior to the Pacific Solution, Indonesia largely ignored migration that would flow from the north to its southern borders closest to Australian shores.[7] Seeking ways to deter boat migrants, the Australian Federal Police and Customs and Border Protection Service began engaging with and funding their Indonesian counterparts by supplying high-speed patrol boats and regularly providing training seminars on people-smuggling. [7] Indonesia is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and does not view refugees as a high priority. When Australia’s prime minister presented an AUD$50 million “Indonesian Solution,” the Indonesia government recommended Mr. Rudd find an “Australian Solution” instead.[7] In 2015, when as many as 6,500 persons departed from Myanmar and Bangladesh, the most affected states (Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia) worked cooperatively to broker a solution based on humanitarian obligation. Bringing the issue to ASEAN, the committee agreed to provide temporary shelter and humanitarian assistance to those at sea.[1] While many human rights advocates condemned the outcome because it did not address durable solutions, the fact remains that Australia did not step up.
In September, New Zealand (NZ) again urged Australia to accept an offer they first put on the table back in 2013—to let NZ resettle eligible refugees from Manus Island and Nauru. Australia has repeatedly rejected the idea due to concerns that NZ would simply become a route for migrants to Australia.[8] Australia’s unwillingness to negotiate the deal further isolates them within the region and highlights a clear condemnation of refugees. Australia has unsuccessfully sought resettlement alternatives in other countries like Cambodia where a AUD$50 million deal has resulted in only seven refugees being resettled.[9] Therefore, Australia must recognize they are violating their obligations under the 1951 Convention and should not penalize refugees for seeking asylum, including interdicting them at sea. If Australia intends to remain a dependable economic and political partner to neighboring nations and expand hegemonic power on the world stage, policy makers should consider what kind of power-broker they want to be in the Pacific. The most successful outcomes will result from utilizing a human-rights focused approach to soft power. If Australia retracts its zero-tolerance policy and closes any remaining off-shore processing centers, they can encourage other nations to take part in the burden-sharing of resettlement. One way to embolden other stakeholders is by working with international organizations to improve economic stability and access to the workforce. If refugees are able to support local economies (as has been proven in other contexts) they can be viewed as valuable assets to a country and legitimate rights-holders. Doing so could also reverse some of the externalization of border policy that Australia has contributed to in nations where migrants often transited with relative freedom, like in Indonesia. If Australia is able to champion this human-rights based approach, they would not only gain regional influence, but also set themselves apart in a world where a state’s sovereignty is far more important than a person’s life.
Bibliography:
Chapter 10 - Pacific Solution: Negotiations and Agreements ... (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/maritimeincident/report/c10
Doherty, B., Davidson, H., & Karp, P. (2016, April 26). Papua New Guinea court rules detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island illegal. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/26/papua-new-guinea-court-rules-detention-asylum-seekers-manus-unconstitutional
Kneebone, Susan. 2017. "Australia as a powerbroker on refugee protection in Southeast Asia:
the relationship with Indonesia." Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees 33(1): 29-41.
Manus Island: Refugees refuse to leave Australian camp amid safety fears. (2017, October 31). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-41812189
McNeill, S., Koloff, S., & Drum, P. (2018, July 30). Cambodia's Hun Sen 'preparing' to receive more refugees under deal with Australia. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-07-30/cambodia-preparing-to-receive-more-refugees-under-australia-deal/10052234
Missbach, Antje. 2014. "Doors and fences: Controlling Indonesia's porous borders and policing asylum seekers." Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35(2): 228-244.
Packham, B. (2018, September 4). NZ offer to take Nauru refugees still on the table. The Australian. Retrieved from https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/nz-offer-to-take-nauru-refugees-still-on-the-table/news-story/23472ed90d83d3bce563d230db2e36ba
United Nations. (n.d.). Australia should not coerce vulnerable people to return to harm. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2017/8/59a558104/australia-coerce-vulnerable-people-return-harm.html
Welcome to the Department of Home Affairs. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.border.gov.au/
Zaiotti, Ruben. 2016. "Mapping remote control: The externalization of migration management
in the 21st century." Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America, and the spread of’ remote control’ practices. Edited by Ruben Zaiotti, Routledge, pp. 19-46.